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Abstract 
 
Background:  Rationing of access to antiretroviral therapy already exists in sub-Saharan 
Africa and will intensify as national treatment programs develop.  The number of people who 
are medically eligible for therapy will far exceed the human, infrastructural, and financial 
resources available, making rationing of public treatment services inevitable.   
 
Methods:  We identified 15 criteria by which antiretroviral therapy could be rationed in 
African countries and analyzed the resulting rationing systems across 5 domains: clinical 
effectiveness, implementation feasibility, cost, economic efficiency, and social equity.   
 
Findings:  Rationing can be explicit or implicit.  Access to treatment can be explicitly 
targeted to priority subpopulations such as mothers of newborns, skilled workers, students, or 
poor people.  Explicit conditions can also be set that cause differential access, such as 
residence in a designated geographic area, co-payment, access to testing, or a demonstrated 
commitment to adhere to therapy.  Implicit rationing on the basis of first-come, first-served or 
queuing will arise when no explicit system is enforced; implicit systems almost always allow 
a high degree of queue-jumping by the elite.  There is a direct tradeoff between economic 
efficiency and social equity.   
 
Interpretation:  Rationing is inevitable in most countries for some period of time.  Without 
deliberate social policy decisions, implicit rationing systems that are neither efficient nor 
equitable will prevail.  Governments that make deliberate choices, and then explain and 
defend those choices to their constituencies, are more likely to achieve a socially desirable 
outcome from the large investments now being made than are those that allow queuing and 
queue-jumping to dominate. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
As the world grapples with the seemingly unstoppable spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, a 
public health experiment of unprecedented scale is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa.  
Governments of countries spanning the continent from Lesotho to Ghana are initiating large-
scale prevention and treatment programs for HIV/AIDS.  Drugs, diagnostic tests, clinic and 
laboratory infrastructure, and training of medical personnel are being paid for by a 
combination of domestic funds mobilized by African governments and international donor 
contributions.   
 
While these funds, which reach into the billions of dollars, will pay for antiretroviral therapy 
for many thousands of HIV-positive Africans, there is almost no chance that African 
countries will have the human, infrastructural, or financial resources to treat everyone who is 
in need, especially in the early years of the experiment.  National plans for treatment rollout 
typically call for a specific number of patients to initiate therapy within the first one or two 
years of the program.  Though the target patient numbers are ambitious, they still represent a 
minority of those who are eligible for antiretrovirals on even the most conservative medical 
grounds.  In Zambia, for example, the first year target for treatment is 10,000 patients; the 
number of Zambians who have already reached the clinical threshold of fewer than 200 CD4 
cells per ml is estimated at 100,000, and thousands more become eligible each year.(1)  The 
stated targets and estimated eligible populations shown in Table 1 indicate the degree of 
rationing that will be necessary in several countries. 
 
Table 1:  Targets for treatment coverage in selected African countries 
 
Country  Target # to be on 
therapy (year) 
Estimated # eligible for 
therapy (year) 
% covered when 
target is reached 
Botswana(2;3) 15,000 (2004) 110,000 (2003) 14% 
Ghana(4;5) 6,000 (2005) 33,000 (est.) (2001)* 18% 
Kenya(6;7) (2005)†  20% 
Malawi(8;9) 25,000 (2008) 200,000 (2003) 13% 
South Africa(10) 138,000 (2004/05)‡ 463,000 (2004) ‡ 30% 
Uganda(11) 30,000 (2005) 100,000 (2003) 30% 
Zambia(12)  10,000 (2004) 100,000 (2003) 10% 
Global (WHO’s 3 x 5 
Initiative)(13) 
3,000,000 (2005) 6,000,000 (2003) 50% 
*Estimate equal to 10% of HIV-positive adults as reported by UNAIDS. 
† Target stated as percentage of eligible population covered only. 
‡New AIDS cases only. 
 
Rationing of antiretroviral therapy is inevitable.  It is already occurring in many African 
countries and will persist for many years to come.  In some countries, explicit policies will be 
adopted to guide the rationing of treatment.  In others, implicit systems for rationing scarce 
resources will arise spontaneously.  Whether explicit or implicit, the rationing systems 
adopted will vary widely in terms of medical effectiveness, cost, feasibility, economic 
efficiency, and social equity.  
 
Our contention in this paper is that the chances of achieving a socially desirable outcome 
from the public health experiment now being launched will be higher if an open public policy 
debate is conducted and policies selected that make transparent the tradeoffs inherent in any 
rationing system.  To help catalyze that debate, we identify and describe a number of possible 
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rationing systems and analyze each system on the basis of likely medical effectiveness, cost, 
feasibility, economic efficiency, and equity.   
 
2.  Criteria for Rationing 
 
The existence of relatively ambitious targets for HIV/AIDS treatment that still represent only 
a minority of those in need means that, by definition, rationing of treatment services will 
occur for at least the initial phase of mass treatment programs.  In this section, we describe a 
number of rationing systems that could be used, or are being used, for allocating treatment 
resources and limiting coverage so that demand matches supply.   
 
In economic terms, any policy or practice that restricts consumption of a good is a rationing 
system.(14)  The purpose of a rationing system is to limit demand so that it matches supply.  
In the marketplace, price is the basis for rationing:  those who can and are willing to pay the 
market price obtain the resource, while those who cannot or will not pay go without.  Non-
market goods, such as access to free or subsidized medical care, are rationed in a variety of 
other ways.  These include stated or explicit rationing strategies, which give priority to 
selected sub-populations or create conditions that favor certain types of patients, and unstated 
or implicit arrangements, such as queuing, which favor those who arrive first or can wait in 
line the longest. 
 
In this paper, we will define a rationing system as any use of public resources that prioritizes 
access to treatment on the basis of any social, economic, cultural, or other non-medical 
criterion.  This is important, as virtually all programs will set medical criteria for access to 
treatment, such as having a CD4 count lower than 200 cells/ml or an AIDS-defining illness.  
Our assumption is that even with conservative medical eligibility criteria, demand for 
treatment will exceed supply.  While medical criteria could result in social or economic 
disparities in access—for example, if access to diagnostic services favors urban households, 
or if those who reach medical eligibility first represent high risk populations—we will 
assume that all countries will apply criteria for medical eligibility equally across all HIV-
positive persons, in order to focus our attention here on the non-medical bases for rationing.   
 
For purposes of simplification, we have drawn a distinction between explicit and implicit 
rationing systems.  In reality, most systems fall along a continuum between the two extremes, 
and the systems are not mutually exclusive:  all countries will adopt, or end up with, some 
combination of several different systems.  It would not be surprising to find two or three 
explicit systems plus all four of the implicit systems operating simultaneously. 
 
Explicit rationing systems 
 
In many cases, governments will set explicit criteria for which types of patients should be 
eligible for antiretroviral therapy first or at lowest cost.  The criteria can designate the sub-
population to which the eligible patients must belong, or they can create conditions that 
intentionally give some patients better access than others.  Assuming criteria for medical 
eligibility have been met, possible socioeconomic sub-populations for priority access include: 
 
• Mothers of new infants (MTCT-Plus):  Rather than face an ever-increasing burden of 
orphan care and support, many countries are making antiretroviral therapy preferentially 
available to HIV-positive mothers through testing and treatment at antenatal clinics.  The 
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“MTCT-Plus” initiative, which has been implemented in multiple African countries, is 
the main example of this strategy.(15)  
 
• Skilled workers:  African countries face the loss of vast numbers of educated or trained 
workers, whose skills are vital to maintaining social welfare, sustaining output, and 
generating economic growth.  Human capital can be conserved by giving treatment 
priority to doctors and nurses, teachers, engineers, judges, police officers, military 
personnel, and other skilled workers whose contributions are important to economic 
development or social stability.  Both Kenya and Uganda have indicated that they will 
ration treatment in this way, Kenya to healthcare workers(16) and Uganda to government 
employees in general.(17) 
 
• Tertiary students:  Society invests a great deal in the education of tertiary level students, 
with the expectation that the investment will be repaid through the contributions that 
highly educated persons make to social and economic development.  In the few places 
where HIV prevalence among university or technical college students has been estimated, 
it is alarmingly high.(18;19)  Targeting these students for access to antiretroviral therapy 
is one way to preserve society’s investment in higher education.   
 
• Poor people:  The social justice agenda pursued by some governments and many 
nongovernmental organizations argues that the poorest members of society, who are least 
likely to be able to afford private medical care, should have preferential access to 
publicly-funded treatment programs.(20)  Means-testing is a common way to ration social 
benefits throughout the industrialized world.  It can be implemented at the level of the 
household or the community and calibrated to achieve the desired number of patients. 
 
Governments can also deliberately create conditions for access to treatment that result in 
rationing, without specifying particular socioeconomic target populations.  Rationing systems 
of this type that are either being implemented now, have been proposed, or can readily be 
envisioned, include: 
 
• Access to and acceptance of testing:  Voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) is 
typically the entry point into an HIV/AIDS treatment program.  Treatment could thus 
effectively be rationed through deliberate targeting of VCT services or promotion 
campaigns, such as those now being implemented at antenatal clinics and in some private 
sector workplaces. 
 
• Families of existing patients:  It is logical to expect that extending treatment to all HIV-
positive members of a household will improve adherence and help maintain household 
stability.  Treatment could be rationed by giving priority to family members of existing 
patients.  An example of this approach is Kenya’s targeting of the spouses of mothers 
identified at antenatal clinics; a study of the effectiveness of this approach known as 
“Safeguard the Household” is underway in South Africa.(21) 
 
• Residents of designated geographic areas:  One obvious way to limit access to 
treatment is to offer it only to those who reside in specified geographic catchment areas.  
These areas can be distributed around the country, centered in regions of high HIV 
prevalence, or concentrated in urban centers or politically important regions.  Excluding 
patients who do not live within the designated areas may not be feasible, but the great 
majority of patients will not be able to afford the cost of regular transport or permanent 
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relocation.  A possible drawback to geographic targeting is that some patients from 
outside the catchment area will initiate therapy but then be forced to quit when they can 
no longer afford transport or accommodation.  
 
• Ability to co-pay:  If patients are required to contribute even a small share of the cost of 
treatment, the number who can access therapy is likely to fall dramatically.  Governments 
could in principle match supply and demand by setting and adjusting the level of co-
payment required.  The obvious outcome is a rationing system that favors the upper 
socioeconomic tiers of patients.  These upper tiers likely include the majority of skilled 
workers and the country’s economic and political leaders.  A possible drawback of 
requiring co-payment is that poorer patients will stop therapy whenever they run out of 
funds.  This is the reason for stopping offered by nearly half of all non-adherent patients 
in a recent study in Botswana.(22) 
 
• Commitment to adherence to therapy:  Adherence to treatment regimens has been 
found to be the most important determinant of the success of antiretroviral therapy at the 
individual patient level.(23)  One way to improve the success of a large-scale treatment 
program, while at the same time limiting access, would therefore be to restrict therapy to 
patients who are believed to have the ability and willingness to adhere.  Trials of 
strategies to improve adherence suggest that requiring attendance at pre-treatment clinic 
visits helps to screen for adherence commitment.(24)  It is not clear to what extent this 
requirement will reduce patient numbers at the national scale, however, and it may 
therefore not have great potential as a rationing scheme. 
 
• Lottery:  In principle, a lottery could be held to distribute “slots” in publicly-funded 
treatment programs.  While a lottery is one of the classic forms of rationing and has 
advantages in terms of equity, it would require knowledge of the HIV status and disease 
stage of great numbers of people, and it is probably not feasible in any of the affected 
countries.   
 
Implicit (de facto) rationing systems 
 
The alternative to specifying explicitly who will have priority access to resources is to allow 
implicit rationing systems to arise.  These can be thought of as the default conditions that will 
prevail in the absence of deliberate policies. 
 
• First come, first served:  In the absence of any other requirements, most facilities are 
likely to treat everyone who is medically eligible, until the supply of drugs, diagnostics, 
or expertise runs out.  Patients who arrive after that happens may be put on a waiting list, 
sent to another facility, or simply sent away.  This approach, which reflects an absolute 
shortage of treatment “slots,” is likely to favor three groups of patients:  those who are 
already paying privately for antiretroviral drugs and shift over to publicly-funded 
treatment once it is available; those who develop AIDS-related symptoms and come to 
the facility for treatment of an opportunistic infection; and the few HIV-positive 
individuals who do not yet have AIDS but have taken the initiative to go for a test and 
know their own status.   
 
• Queuing:  One of the most common ways to ration scarce resources is the time-honored, 
time-consuming tradition of queuing.  While some countries create waiting lists that keep 
track of individuals’ places in line, in many African countries the queue is a literal line 
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outside the clinic door.  Such queuing will favor patients whose opportunity cost of time 
is low and thus are able to wait in line for long periods of time.  This group is likely to be 
dominated by unemployed men and by women who can bring their small children with 
them.  It may penalize farming households, where high seasonal demand for labour may 
preclude spending time in a health facility queue.   
 
• Limited sites:  Most countries will scale up their treatment programs incrementally, at 
first offering services at only a few facilities before gradually adding more.  Botswana, 
for example, started with just 4 sites in 2002; the number is now 10, and 20 more are 
planned for 2004.(25;26)  For the large numbers of patients who will not live within 
walking distance of a treatment site, bus or taxi fare will be required for regular trips to 
the clinic, and each trip will take up a good deal of time.  Previous research has found that 
travel time plays an important role in rationing medical care.(27)  Unless transport is 
subsidized, limiting the number of service sites will effectively ration treatment to those 
who live nearby and to better-off households that have the resources to travel.   
 
• Queue jumping:  Finally, in all of these implicit systems, and in some of the explicit 
ones, there will very often be a high degree of queue jumping, in which those with social, 
economic, or political influence move to the front of the treatment line.  Elites capture a 
disproportionate share of resources in all countries; in developing countries, where 
enforcement of rules tends to be weak and informal arrangements common, it is safe to 
assume that members of the elite who are medically eligible for therapy will find a way to 
get it.  De facto rationing on the basis of social or economic position thus occurs.  It is the 
phenomenon of queue jumping that turns what appears to be an equitable, if inefficient, 
rationing system—queuing—into an inequitable and inefficient approach.   
 
Many other potential criteria for rationing antiretroviral therapy can be imagined.  Treatment 
access could be targeted to young people (because they respond best to the therapy and have 
the most productive years ahead of them); those with debts (so that the loan default rate does 
not increase); commercial sex workers (to reduce HIV transmission by suppressing viral load 
in core risk groups); or income earners (to maintain household welfare).  For this paper, we 
have selected a set of rationing systems that are either in use now; are very likely to develop; 
or, as in the case of a lottery, help to clarify the issue of rationing in general. 
 
3.  Evaluating the Systems:  Effectiveness, Cost, Feasibility, Efficiency, and Equity  
 
The different approaches to rationing antiretroviral therapy described above will inevitably 
have very different social and economic consequences for African populations.  In this 
section, we assess the rationing systems’ probable outcomes across five domains that capture 
the most important principles that governments use to evaluate policies and social 
investments.  They are by no means the sole domains of interest, nor should they necessarily 
be weighted equally.  We propose them only as a starting point for thinking about the 
implications of alternative approaches.   
 
For purposes of this paper, we define the five domains as follows: 
 
• Effectiveness:  Ratio of successfully treated patients to all treated patients within five 
years of starting therapy.  This is a measure of medical effectiveness.  “Successful 
treatment” can be defined as a fully suppressed viral load, high CD4 count, or another 
biomedical indicator.  We assume that early diagnosis and high adherence both improve 
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effectiveness; we also assume that patient motivation improves adherence, but level of 
education and socioeconomic status do not.(28) 
 
• Cost minimization:  “Savings” per patient treated relative to a high-cost standard.   
Cost is characterized in this way to maintain internal consistency:  a rating of “high” in 
this domain is desirable, as it is in all other domains.  Cost is defined broadly, to include 
the average of the direct and indirect costs incurred by patients, providers, insurers, and 
the public health system, beginning with the initial identification of patients and including 
the costs of managing side effects and treatment failure.   
 
• Feasibility:  Probability that the human and infrastructural resources needed for 
implementation will be available.  We define an approach as highly feasible if there are 
no obstacles to carrying it out that appear to be insurmountable under typical conditions 
in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of cost and political acceptability.  Cost is 
captured by the previous domain, while political acceptability will be determined by the 
ratings the system receives across all domains.  
 
• Efficiency:  net benefits of the treatment program for human capital accumulation, where 
human capital is defined as the accumulated skill, knowledge and expertise of 
workers.(29) This is a measure of economic efficiency intended to capture the probable 
consequences of the program for long term economic development.   
 
• Equity:  probability that poor or disadvantaged sub-populations have equal access to 
HIV/AIDS treatment as wealthier or more advantaged populations.  We define “equity” 
to denote equitable access for all at the current time, not redistribution of resources to 
redress past injustices.   
 
Table 2 compares each of the main approaches to rationing across these five domains.  For 
purposes of comparison, we have included rationing based on medical criteria in the table.   
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Table 2:  Comparison of rationing systems  
 
? high 
? moderate 
? low  
 
Rationing 
system 
Effectiveness  
(medical effectiveness) 
Cost Minimization  
(savings per patient treated) 
Feasibility  
(ease of implementation) 
Efficiency  
(human capital preservation) 
Equity  
(equitable access) 
Medical 
eligibility (e.g. 
CD4<200) 
? 
Moderate:  Limits treatment to those 
already sick, of whom many will be too 
sick to save; could favor those who were 
infected earliest, who may be highest risk. 
? 
Moderate:  Requires only one 
clinic visit to establish 
eligibility, but maintains need to 
treat initial opportunistic 
infections. 
? 
Moderate:  Requires access to 
diagnostic services.  May not 
sufficiently reduce patient 
numbers. 
? 
Low:  No targeting on human capital 
basis. 
? 
Moderate:  All HIV+ individuals 
equally eligible, but favors those who 
have access to diagnostic services, 
who may be wealthier or urban. 
Mothers of 
new infants 
? 
Moderate:  Patients are likely to be 
motivated to succeed, but loss to follow 
up may be high as some patients will not 
yet be medically eligible for treatment 
when baby is born. 
? 
Moderate:  Relies on existing 
antenatal clinic infrastructure, 
but tests large numbers of people 
per medically eligible patient. 
? 
High:  Already in place under 
MTCT-Plus. 
? 
High:  Reduces societal burden of 
orphan care and promotes parental 
investment in future human capital.  
? 
Low:  Excludes men; excludes women 
who have not recently given birth. 
Skilled 
workers 
? 
High:  Patients are in a structured 
environment and likely to place a high 
value on ability to work. 
? 
High:  Tightly defined 
population; many employers  
already provide some medical 
facilities.  
? 
High:  Already being 
implemented by many 
employers. 
? 
High:  Preserves critical skills 
needed to maintain development. 
? 
Low: Treats the elite; excludes the 
poor, unemployed, unskilled. 
Tertiary 
students 
? 
Moderate:  Patients are likely to be 
motivated and in a structured 
environment, but adherence has been low 
for this age group(34) and students who 
graduate may be lost to follow up. 
? 
High:  Tightly defined 
population; can rely on 
institutions’ existing have 
medical facilities. 
? 
High:  Institutions already have 
medical facilities and patients 
live nearby. 
? 
High:  Preserves critical skills 
needed to maintain development. 
? 
Low: Treats the elite; excludes those 
without access to tertiary education. 
Poor people ? 
Moderate:  Adherence has been variable 
in pilot projects.(35)  Little experience 
with large scale delivery to poor 
communities. 
? 
Low:  Requires geographically 
dispersed services to areas with 
least existing infrastructure. 
? 
Moderate:  Some capacity for 
means testing may already exist, 
but fraud is likely. Infrastructure 
may not be adequate in poorest 
areas. 
? 
Low:  Targets relatively 
economically unproductive 
subpopulations. 
? 
Moderate:  Extends access to 
subpopulations that would not 
otherwise have it, but excludes middle 
and upper socioeconomic tiers. 
Access to and 
acceptance of 
testing 
? 
Moderate:  Could favor more motivated 
patients. 
? 
Moderate:  Requires no 
additional action to identify 
patients. 
? 
High:  Some early successes 
with VCT campaigns suggest 
feasibility. 
? 
Moderate:  Favors target populations 
for VCT campaigns, who may or 
may not be efficient populations to 
treat. 
? 
Moderate:  Favors some but does not 
exclude others. 
Families of 
current 
patients 
? 
High:  Promotes early diagnosis, 
minimizes drug sharing, encourages 
adherence and support within families.  
? 
Moderate:  Requires little 
additional action to identify 
patients. 
? 
Moderate:  Easy to implement if 
family is nearby; difficult for 
migrants. 
? 
Moderate:  No targeting of human 
capital but sustains households as 
economic units. 
? 
Low:  Gives more resources to 
families that already have some 
access. 
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Rationing 
system 
Effectiveness  
(medical effectiveness) 
Cost Minimization  
(savings per patient treated) 
Feasibility  
(ease of implementation) 
Efficiency  
(human capital preservation) 
Equity  
(equitable access) 
Residents of 
designated 
geographic 
areas 
? 
Moderate:  Ensures patient proximity to 
services, but patients may interrupt or stop 
treatment when they must leave the 
catchment area. 
? 
High: Minimizes total 
infrastructure costs. 
? 
Moderate:  Easy to establish, but 
difficult to prevent excluded 
patients from migrating into 
catchment areas. 
? 
Moderate:  Could be targeted to 
economically important areas, but no 
targeting within catchment areas. 
? 
Moderate:  Equal access for everyone 
in catchment areas, but excludes 
everyone outside catchment areas. 
Ability to co-
pay 
? 
Moderate:  Co-payment may increase 
motivation to adhere, but many patients 
will stop treatment when own funds run 
short. 
? 
Moderate:  Cost to public sector 
is reduced, but cost to patients is 
higher. 
? 
High:  Easy to implement and 
already underway in many 
places. 
? 
High:  Reaches employed persons; 
extends public resources to allow 
more patients to be treated. 
? 
Low:  Excludes those too poor to pay. 
Demonstrated 
commitment 
to adhere 
? 
High: Limits treatment to those most 
likely to adhere. 
? 
Moderate:  Procedure for 
demonstrating adherence has 
additional cost. 
? 
Moderate:  Requires  procedure 
for demonstrating commitment 
be widely available.  May not 
sufficiently reduce patient 
numbers. 
? 
Moderate:  Could target more 
motivated patients. 
? 
High:  Equal access to all potential 
patients. 
Lottery ? 
Low:  Random sample across all 
adherence and motivation levels. 
? 
Low:  Would require new 
infrastructure and administrative 
capacity to run. 
? 
Low:  Could result in a widely 
dispersed and diverse patient 
population. Requires that all 
potential patients be identified. 
? 
Low:  No targeting on human capital 
basis. 
? 
High:  Everyone has an equal chance 
of being chosen. 
First come, 
first served 
? 
Low:  Favors those who are already sick; 
could favor those who were infected 
earliest, who may be highest risk. 
? 
High:  Requires no additional 
action to identify patients. 
? 
High:  Default; requires little 
action. 
? 
Low:  No targeting on human capital 
basis. 
? 
High:  Everyone has access. 
Queuing  ? 
Moderate:  Favors those who are already 
sick but could target most motivated. 
? 
High:  Requires no additional 
action to identify patients. 
? 
High:  Default; requires little 
action. 
? 
Low:  Favors patients with low 
opportunity cost of time (e.g. those 
who are unemployed) and wastes 
time of those who participate. 
? 
High:  Everyone has access. 
Limited sites ? 
Moderate:  Ensures patient proximity to 
services, but distant patients may stop 
treatment when they can no longer afford 
transport. 
? 
High:  Minimizes infrastructure 
needs and requires no additional 
action to identify patients. 
? 
High:  Default; requires little 
action. 
? 
Moderate:  Sites could be located in 
economically important areas, but 
treatment will not be targeted on 
human capital basis. 
? 
Low:  Excludes those too poor to pay 
for transport or who live in remote 
areas. 
Queue 
jumping 
? 
High:  Likely to target very motivated 
patients. 
? 
High:  Requires no additional 
action to identify patients. 
? 
High:  Default; requires little 
action. 
? 
Moderate:  Favors elite; could 
preserve human, social, or political 
capital. 
? 
Low:  Treats the elite; those who 
already have resources obtain more. 
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There are several limitations to the analysis presented in Table 2.  First and foremost, we do 
not “know” the outcomes of the strategies described above, because most of them have not 
yet been tried (or, if tried, not evaluated).  Prior experience in delivering health care in sub-
Saharan Africa strongly suggests that some of our assumptions and ratings are correct.  We 
are very confident, for example, that an implicit rationing system based on queuing will result 
in queue-jumping, and therefore be highly inequitable.  We are also confident that targeting 
skilled workers will maintain labour productivity and therefore promote economic efficiency.  
Our ratings of many of the other systems, in contrast, are largely speculative.  We do not 
know, for example, the efficiency of using “demonstrated commitment to adhere” as a 
rationing criterion.  We can reasons that it will target relatively motivated patients, who may 
in turn represent the more productive members of society, but this is no more than 
speculation.  The purpose of the ratings is to catalyze debate, not provide a “right” answer.   
 
A second limitation involves the domains we selected for evaluation.  We chose five that we 
believe capture the key considerations in designing an HIV/AIDS treatment program.  We 
omitted a potential sixth domain, the impact of the rationing system on HIV transmission, 
because we do not believe we have sufficient data or experience even to speculate.  We also 
did not account for potential interactions among the domains.  Cost and feasibility are clearly 
related, for example:  at some level of cost, any system could be considered feasible. While 
medical effectiveness clearly influences cost, the reverse might also hold:  greater spending 
on adherence support, for example, could lead to a higher proportion of successfully treated 
patients.  At a different level, many would argue that social equity is essential to sustainable 
economic development, and that efficiency and equity cannot therefore be separated.  While 
we recognize that these relationships exist, neither data nor experience allow us to address 
them here. 
 
4.  Conclusions:  Efficiency, Equity, Reality 
 
During the initial months of existing antiretroviral therapy programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 
widespread reluctance to be tested for HIV or enroll in treatment programs has greatly limited 
patient numbers.(30;31)  This phenomenon, for as long as it persists, may prevent demand 
from exceeding supply, and no rationing will be necessary.  There will surely be some 
situations, however, in which patients demanding access to care will overwhelm available 
resources.  Even under the most optimistic scenarios for reaching universal coverage, there 
will be a period of at least several years when treatment is scarce.  In the absence of an 
explicit rationing system, implicit rationing, accompanied by a high level of queue-jumping, 
is bound to arise.   
 
Rationing of medical care is not a new phenomenon, nor is by any means limited to 
developing countries.  Waiting lists, whether for specific procedures, organs for transplant, or 
experimental treatments are common in North America and Europe.  Many state governments 
in the United States are explicitly limiting access to more expensive AIDS drugs.(32)  The 
HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa is simply bringing the need for rationing into stark relief.   
 
Decisions about rationing will be made at multiple levels of the healthcare system.  
International funding agencies have already begun to express their priorities through the 
amounts and conditions of their grants.  Ministries of health will set policies that reflect 
national priorities, followed by district and local departments of health.  Even individual 
healthcare workers, such as nurses at clinics where antiretroviral drugs are available but 
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scarce, will be forced to ration access to patients who meet the clinic’s or their own 
criteria.(33) 
 
There is no single rationing system, or combination of systems, that will be optimal for all 
countries at all times.  Table 2 makes the tradeoff between economic efficiency and social 
equity unmistakably clear:  all of the rationing systems that rate high in terms of efficiency 
rate low in terms of equity.  African societies will place different weights on the values 
inherent in goals such as “equity” and “efficiency.”  South Africa’s national plan, reflecting 
the country’s political culture, emphasizes the social justice definition of equity.  Other 
countries, especially those without a tradition of social action, are likely to value efficiency 
more highly.   
 
Because access to antiretroviral drugs is a matter of life or death for AIDS patients, the 
choice of rationing systems matters deeply.  African governments can take one of two 
courses:  ration deliberately, on the basis of explicit criteria, or allow implicit rationing to 
prevail.  Implicit rationing is unlikely to maximize social welfare, nor does it allow for 
transparency and accountability in policy making.  We believe that the magnitude of the 
experiment now underway, and the importance of the resource allocation decisions to be 
made, call for public policy analysis and debate in the countries affected.  In the absence of 
such processes, decisions about access to treatment will be made arbitrarily and will, most 
likely, result in inequity and inefficiency—the worst of both worlds. 
 
In the end, the distribution of treatment resources in African countries will reflect a 
combination of explicit and implicit approaches to rationing.  Our premise in this paper is that 
governments that make deliberate choices, and then explain and defend those choices to their 
constituencies, are more likely to achieve a socially desirable return from the large 
investments now being made than are those that allow queuing and queue-jumping to 
dominate.  Countries that promote an open policy debate have the opportunity to ration 
antiretroviral therapy in a manner that sustains both economic development and social 
cohesion—in the age of AIDS, the best of both worlds. 
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